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1899 
Note 
 
The Problem with Waste: Delaware’s Lenient 
Treatment of Waste Claims at the Demand Stage 
of Derivative Litigation 
Jamie L. Kastler∗ 
In 2006, Citigroup was the United States’ largest financial 
institution.1 Its assets were worth $244 billion,2 its share price 
hovered around $54,3 and it employed over 332,000 people.4 
Then the subprime mortgage crisis began.5 Starting in 2007, 
Citigroup posted significant losses in consecutive quarters due, 
in large part, to its investments in subprime mortgage-backed 
debt.6 By November 2008 Citigroup was worth only $20.5 bil-
lion, its once significant share price settled at a measly $3.77, 
and it had lost around 75,000 employees.7  
In November 2007 while the financial crisis decimated Cit-
igroup, its chief executive officer (CEO) and chair of the board 
of directors, Charles Prince, resigned.8 Despite Prince reigning 
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and brothers, Jason and Benjamin, for their unconditional support and encour-
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 1. Cf. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk: 
Bank Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 22348662. 
 2. See id. at A34. 
 3. See James Doran, “Everything on Table” in Citigroup Crisis Talks, 
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/ 
nov/21/citigroup-banking. 
 4. Fortune Global 500 2007: Citigroup, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn 
.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2007/snapshots/2927.html (last visited Apr. 
10, 2011). 
 5. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1. 
 6. See Doran, supra note 3. 
 7. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1. 
 8. See Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Robert E. Rubin to Serve as Chair-
man of the Board of Citi; Sir Win Bischoff to Serve as Acting Chief Executive 
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over Citigroup during a time when the corporation lost billions 
of dollars, Citigroup’s board of directors granted him the sub-
stantial resignation package of “a $10 million bonus, $28 mil-
lion in unvested stock options and $1.5 million in yearly 
perks.”9 Given Citigroup’s decline and the timing and size of 
the departing CEO’s golden parachute, it is not surprising that 
some of Citigroup’s stockholders wanted to hold the members of 
its board of directors, who are the statutorily designated man-
agers of the corporation,10 personally liable for the corporation’s 
disastrous change of circumstances.11 
Citigroup is incorporated in Delaware.12 Under Delaware 
corporate law, members of a board of directors owe fiduciary 
duties to their corporation and its shareholders.13 One method 
for shareholders to bring a lawsuit against a board of directors 
for a breach of these fiduciary duties is through shareholder de-
rivative litigation, meaning that the shareholders sue the direc-
tors on behalf of the corporation.14 Delaware corporate law does 
not, however, make it easy to hold directors personally liable 
for breaches of their fiduciary duties.15 One of the protections 
against personal liability for directors of Delaware corporations 
is an exculpation clause in the corporation’s certificate of incor-
poration.16 Exculpation clauses protect directors from liability 
for their business decisions on behalf of the corporation, except 
for, among other things, acts that violate their fiduciary duty of 
 
Officer; Charles Prince Elects to Retire from Citi (Nov. 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/071104a.htm. 
 9. See Brian Wingfield, Puzzling Pay Packages, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/07/congress-executive-compensation-lead-comp 
-cx_bw_0307ceopay.html. 
 10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
 11. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (providing background on the shareholder action against Citi-
group directors and officers). 
 12. See id. at 112. This Note focuses on Delaware corporate law, as most 
major corporations are incorporated in that state. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewen-
stein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 
787 (1994). 
 13. See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114 n.6. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 111 (noting that the action in question was brought by 
shareholders “on behalf of Citigroup Inc.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (acknowledging that directors are generally not responsible for cor-
porate losses). 
 16. See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 695–96 (2d ed. 2008); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (providing for exculpation clauses in Delaware corpo-
ration law). 
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loyalty, are not in good faith, or “involve intentional misconduct 
or a knowing violation of law.”17 If a plaintiff does not success-
fully plead one of these exceptions to the coverage of an excul-
pation clause against directors shielded by such a clause, Del-
aware courts dismiss the case.18 
In February 2009 the Delaware Court of Chancery decided 
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, a deriva-
tive suit by Citigroup stockholders against, amongst others, di-
rectors of the corporation.19 The only claim that survived the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss was that the directors committed 
corporate waste by approving the resignation package for 
Charles Prince.20 Given that Citigroup’s certificate of incorpo-
ration contains an exculpation clause,21 the survival of the 
waste claim suggests that waste is now a part of the obligation 
of good faith.22 If true, then a successfully pled waste claim will 
allow shareholders to hold directors personally liable for any 
business decisions that constitute waste, even if they are pro-
tected by an exculpation clause.23 
This Note argues that the Delaware courts should explicit-
ly place waste under the obligation of good faith. Part I de-
scribes fiduciary duties and shareholder derivative litigation 
under Delaware corporate law. Part II examines the evolving 
procedural placement of waste within the Delaware fiduciary 
duty framework and the factual requirements for waste to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand. Part III 
suggests that waste should be placed under the duty of good 
faith, but that a uniform heightened factual requirement is nec-
essary to prevent the Delaware courts from infringing upon the 
power of directors to manage their corporations. This Note con-
cludes that directors who commit corporate waste should not be 
 
 17. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124–25 (citing tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)). 
 18. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 503–07 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(dismissing a complaint for failing to allege facts sufficient to support a claim 
that, among other things, a corporation’s officers and directors breached their 
duty of good faith by failing to adequately oversee the preparation of financial 
statements). 
 19. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111, 139–40. 
 20. See id. at 111–12, 139–40. 
 21. See id. at 124. 
 22. See id. at 139 n.113 (“‘The Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly 
held that committing waste is an act of bad faith.’” (quoting In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 75 
(Del. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (noting the obliga-
tions that directors and officers cannot evade via exculpation clauses). 
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afforded the protections granted by their corporation’s section 
102(b)(7) exculpation clause. Additionally, the Delaware courts 
should uniformly apply a particularized factual requirement to 
waste claims at the demand stage of litigation to ensure that 
only worthwhile claims reach discovery. 
I.  FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
UNDER DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW   
Under Delaware corporate law, members of the board of di-
rectors of a corporation are protected from many types of liabil-
ity flowing from their business decisions.24 While the directors 
are bound by numerous fiduciary duties, only some are viable 
bases for liability available to shareholders who desire to bring 
suits against individual directors.25 This Part describes the pro-
tections granted to directors under Delaware corporate law, the 
fiduciary duties that bind the directors, and a prominent mech-
anism for shareholders to pursue litigation against directors. 
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The directors of a Delaware corporation are protected by 
the judicially created business judgment rule.26 This rule oper-
ates as a presumption that, in making business decisions, the 
board of directors acts “on an informed basis, in good faith,” 
and with the best interests of the corporation in mind.27 The ra-
tionale for the business judgment rule is that boards of direc-
tors are granted the authority to manage the corporation under 
Delaware law.28 As such, the courts, which are considered ill 
 
 24. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Ex-
panding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1772 (2007) (“[T]he busi-
ness judgment rule . . . shields corporate managers from judicial scrutiny of 
their decisions.”); see also In re Walt Disney (Disney V ), 906 A.2d at 52 (de-
scribing the presumptions undergirding the business judgment rule). 
 25. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (providing for exculpation clauses that eliminate 
the liability of directors for violations of their duty of care). 
 26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on 
other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 27. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). But see Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
83, 87–88 (2004) (arguing in favor of viewing the business judgment rule as an 
abstention doctrine). 
 28. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (citing DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974)). 
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equipped to second-guess the substantive business decisions of 
the board, should generally defer to their judgment.29 
In order for plaintiffs to rebut the presumption of the busi-
ness judgment rule, they must show that the director-
defendants violated one of their fiduciary duties.30 If plaintiffs 
succeed in demonstrating such a violation, the director-
defendants can only avoid liability by demonstrating that the 
transaction in question was “entirely fair” to the corporation.31 
If, however, the plaintiffs fail to rebut the presumption, then 
Delaware courts will invoke the business judgment rule and 
rule in favor of the director-defendants.32 
B. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Directors of Delaware corporations are bound by a series of 
fiduciary duties. Any violation of their duty of loyalty or care, or 
a transaction that constitutes waste, is a basis of liability to 
hold the offending directors personally liable. 
1. Directors’ Duty of Loyalty 
Directors of Delaware corporations are under a duty of 
loyalty to their company.33 The traditional aspect of the duty of 
loyalty obliges directors to avoid transactions that involve a fi-
nancial conflict of interest.34 Directors violate this duty if they 
act for their own benefit in a transaction that is not “substan-
tively fair to the corporation.”35 If the conflict-of-interest trans-
action is not ratified by fully informed directors or sharehold-
ers,36 the transaction will be subject to the “entire fairness” 
analysis.37 This analysis has two prongs: fair dealing and fair 
 
 29. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that the policy behind the business judgment rule pro-
vides “good reasons to minimize . . . substantive review”). 
 30. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) 
(stating that the business judgment rule may be rebutted by a showing that 
the directors violated their fiduciary duties or made a decision primarily to 
“perpetuate themselves in office”). 
 31. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). 
 32. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 958–59; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 33. 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW, at GCL-IV-27 (5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 34. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 
1345 (Del. 1987); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 35. 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-29. 
 36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001 & Supp. 2010). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I ), 731 A.2d 
342, 367 (Del. Ch. 1998). But see Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties 
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price.38 The fair dealing prong requires the court to analyze the 
process under which the directors made the decision to approve 
the transaction.39 Under the fair price prong, the court analyzes 
whether the transaction was substantively fair to the corpora-
tion.40 It is only if the conflict of interest transaction satisfies 
the “entire fairness” test that the directors avoid liability for a 
breach of their duty of loyalty.41 
Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court expanded the duty 
of loyalty to include the duty of good faith.42 Good faith was 
previously considered one part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties, 
on par with the duties of loyalty and care.43 In Stone ex rel. 
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the duty of good faith is not a separate basis for 
personal liability, but, instead, is a part of the duty of loyalty.44 
As such, a violation of the duty of good faith creates personal 
liability for directors under the duty of loyalty.45 
The exact contours of the duty of good faith are anything 
but clear. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney 
V ), the Delaware Supreme Court established that an “inten-
tional dereliction of duty” or a “conscious disregard for one’s re-
sponsibilities” constitutes bad faith.46 The court was clear, 
however, that this definition was not exclusive of what would 
 
Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1242–43 (2010) (dis-
cussing some financial conflict-of-interest transactions that are not subject to 
the “entire fairness” test). 
 38. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 710–11. The “entire fairness” test is not an evaluation 
between two completely “bifurcated” factors, but rather “[a]ll aspects of the 
issue must be examined as a whole.” Id. 
 42. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006). The duty of good faith was not the only basis for liability added to the 
duty of loyalty since the early 1980s. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (introducing the standard 
to be applied when a board attempts to sell the corporation); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985) (introducing a different 
standard for when a board attempts to prevent a hostile takeover); Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (addressing the situation 
where the directors decide whether to pursue derivative litigation). 
 43. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 44. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 62–67 
(Del. 2006)). 
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constitute bad faith.47 Thus, while the Delaware courts pro-
vided some notion of what constitutes bad faith, the full extent 
of the doctrine remains vague.48 
2. Directors’ Duty of Care and Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation 
Clauses 
Directors of Delaware corporations are also bound by the 
fiduciary duty of care.49 The most prominent duty of care case 
is Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the Delaware Supreme Court 
held the director-defendants liable for a violation of their duty 
of care for inadequately informing themselves during the pro-
cedure to sell the corporation.50 Van Gorkom established that 
directors violate their duty of care if they are “grossly negli-
gent” in making a decision.51 In Van Gorkom and subsequent 
duty of care cases, the Delaware courts’ duty of care analysis 
focused on the board’s decisionmaking process, rather than the 
substantive decisions of the directors.52 
Following the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van 
Gorkom, liability insurance for directors rose dramatically in 
price, and many feared that qualified directors would avoid 
membership on boards due to the increased potential for incur-
ring personal liability.53 The Delaware state legislature re-
sponded to this situation by adding section 102(b)(7) exculpa-
 
 47. See id. at 67 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
at 755–56). The Stone court also included a Caremark failure to institute mon-
itoring and reporting systems, or to “act in the face of a known duty to act,” 
under the bad faith rubric. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citing Guttman v. Huang, 
823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)). See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc. De-
rivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (introducing the Caremark 
fiduciary standard). 
 48. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business 
Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 
66 MD. L. REV. 398, 421–32 (2007) (stating that “[i]n light of the confusion that 
has surrounded the duty of good faith, Disney V [sic] creates a degree of clari-
ty,” but the decision “fails to discuss the appropriate standard of review”). 
 49. See, e.g., 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-25. 
 50. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985), overruled on oth-
er grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).  
 51. See id. at 874. 
 52. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-IV-25 to -27. Delaware 
courts rejected subsequent challenges to the substantive decisions of directors 
under the duty of care analysis. See, e.g., Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land 
Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792, 807 (Del. Ch. 1993); Jedwab v. MGM 
Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 600 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 53. See 1 WELCH ET AL., supra note 33, at GCL-I-28. 
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tion clauses to Delaware’s corporate law.54 If a corporation in-
cludes such a clause in its certificate of incorporation, the direc-
tors of the corporation are indemnified from personal financial 
liability for many violations of their fiduciary duties, including 
any breach of their duty of care.55 Directors protected by an ex-
culpation clause are not, however, protected from liability aris-
ing from, among other things, a breach of their duty of loyalty, 
or “acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.”56 
The emergence of section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses lim-
its the mechanisms whereby shareholders can hold directors 
personally liable for their business decisions.57 As exculpation 
clauses indemnify directors for a violation of their duty of care, 
Delaware courts dismiss any due care claims against protected 
directors.58 To survive such a dismissal, the plaintiffs must 
properly allege that the director-defendants had a conflict of in-
terest in the challenged transaction or acted in bad faith.59 If 
the plaintiffs succeed in showing either of these, the director-
defendants will lose both the protection of the business judg-
ment rule and indemnification from the corporation’s section 
102(b)(7) exculpation clause.60 As most Delaware corporations 
now have section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses in their certifi-
cates,61 plaintiffs who wish to hold directors personally liable 
for their business decisions must find ways to properly allege a 
violation of the duty of loyalty, including bad faith, to survive 
the director-defendants’ motion to dismiss.62 While a violation 
 
 54. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 24, at 1772. 
 55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (noting 
that “Delaware courts have consistently held” that exculpation clauses protect 
directors against due care claims). A claim that is not solely based upon the 
duty of care, on the other hand, is not subject to dismissal due to the presence 
of a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause in the corporation’s certificate. See 
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001). 
 59. See, e.g., In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 178–79 
(Del. Ch. 2005) (“[An exculpation clause] does not provide protection against 
claims based on . . . acts or omissions not in good faith and violations of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.”). 
 60. Cf. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 24, at 1773. 
 61. Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 519, 564 (2009). 
 62. See Gold, supra note 48, at 432–33 (“An allegation of bad faith may be 
the sole route to director liability in many instances of corporate litigation, as-
suming directors do not have a conflict of interest.”). 
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of the duty of loyalty is now clearly a viable claim for plaintiffs 
to hold directors liable, the question remains as to the types of 
loyalty claims available to shareholders to bring suit against 
directors. 
3. The Waste Standard 
Directors of Delaware corporations are under an obligation 
not to waste corporate assets.63 Plaintiffs meet the waste stand-
ard if they demonstrate that the director-defendants authorized 
an exchange that was “so one sided that no business person of 
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation 
has received adequate consideration.”64 A Delaware court will 
only find waste in the “rare, ‘unconscionable case where direc-
tors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’”65 
This exacting standard is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to meet.66 If the shareholder-plaintiffs succeed in demonstrat-
ing waste, the business judgment rule will no longer protect the 
director-defendants.67 
 
 63. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–92 (1933); Gottlieb v. Hey-
den Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663–64 (Del. 1952); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 
602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
 64. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). For a claim of corporate waste to survive a motion 
to dismiss, the complaint must allege “facts showing the corporation received 
no consideration, or that a transfer of corporate assets served no corporate 
purpose.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., 
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
24, 2004). See generally Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (“‘If . . . there is any substan-
tial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good faith 
judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there 
should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex post 
that the transaction was unreasonably risky.’” (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997))). 
 65. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263). 
 66. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (describing waste as “theoretical”); Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 
13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“But rarest of all—and 
indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-existent—would be the case of disinterested 
business people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the 
legal standard of waste!”). But see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (“[W]e do not fore-
close the possibility that a properly framed complaint [alleging waste] could 
pass muster.”); Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 
1952) (holding that a salary decision by directors was a gift of corporate funds 
“amounting to waste”). See generally Velasco, supra note 37, at 1235 (“[Waste 
is] the most deferential standard of all.”). 
 67. Cf., e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A 
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its 
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The difficulty of proving waste is a reflection of the perva-
siveness of the business judgment rule and its tenet that, ab-
sent allegations of fraud or conflict of interest, Delaware courts 
will not second-guess the substantive decisions of boards.68 
Waste is the exception to this rule and forces the court to ana-
lyze the substantive decision of the defendants.69 The waste ex-
ception, therefore, functions as a means to “police[] the outer 
boundaries” of the discretion granted to a board of directors 
under Delaware corporate law.70 It is not entirely clear where 
waste falls within the Delaware fiduciary duty doctrinal 
framework. 
C. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
Shareholders who wish to bring suit against directors of a 
corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties will typically pur-
sue a derivative action.71 Shareholder derivative litigation is 
equivalent to the shareholder-plaintiff compelling the corpora-
tion to sue the director-defendants for harm done to the corpo-
ration.72 As the corporation is technically the plaintiff, any re-
covery gained through derivative litigation goes to the 
corporation, rather than to the shareholder-plaintiffs.73 The 
shareholder-plaintiffs benefit through both their share in the 
corporation and, more importantly, the grant of attorneys’ fees 
 
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational busi-
ness purpose.”). 
 68. Steiner, 1995 WL 441999, at *5; see also Jaclyn J. Janssen, In re Walt 
Disney Company Derivative Litigation : Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too 
Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1573, 1597 (“[C]ourts are reluctant to undertake a substan-
tive review of director decisions.”). 
 69. See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051–52. 
 70. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 71. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996). To pursue 
derivative litigation, the plaintiffs must be shareholders in the corporation. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2001). Some claims, including corporate 
waste, may only be brought in derivative actions. Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 
Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988) (holding that any claim of waste “is entirely 
derivative in nature”). Shareholders may also bring direct suits against direc-
tors for many claims, but this approach is frequently undesirable due to stand-
ing requirements, see Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. 
Ch. 1985) (citing Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del. 
Ch. 1967)), and the small relative benefit for each shareholder in bringing a 
direct suit, see Bird, 681 A.2d at 402–03. 
 72. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 
(Del. 2004). 
 73. Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1124 (Del. 1988). 
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if the litigation is successful.74 The downside of these attorneys’ 
fees is that some plaintiffs and lawyers will bring frivolous law-
suits against directors to gain the fees.75 
To ensure that only worthwhile derivative suits reach trial 
and to protect the deference granted to directors of Delaware 
corporations to manage their company, the Delaware courts 
utilize the demand requirement.76 Under the demand require-
ment, shareholders of a corporation who wish for the corpora-
tion to bring suit against its directors have two options.77 First, 
they may ask the board of directors to sue the director-
defendants.78 This is problematic, in that the board is not likely 
to sue its own members.79 Additionally, the courts will defer to 
the board’s business judgment in refusing the plaintiff ’s de-
mand.80 
The second option for shareholders is to forego demand and 
claim demand futility.81 If shareholder-plaintiffs do not bring 
 
 74. See Bird, 681 A.2d at 403. 
 75. See William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord III, Towards a Relaxed 
Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A New 
Weapon Against “Strike” Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 925 (1990); Roberta 
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 55, 65 (1991) (arguing that attorneys are the primary beneficiaries of 
derivative suits); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from 
Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) (“Shareholders seldom profit—suits 
are filed because their attorneys stand to reap substantial fees.”). But see Rob-
ert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Deriv-
ative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749–50 (2004) (arguing that most de-
rivative suits are not strike suits). 
 76. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); cf. Jones v. Taylor, 
348 A.2d 188, 191 (Del. Ch. 1975) (describing the shareholder-standing re-
quirement, enumerated in title 8, section 327 of the Delaware Code, as an ad-
ditional method to eliminate strike suits). 
 77. See Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 
(Del. 1988). 
 78. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a) (“[Complaints in derivative actions must] 
allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the 
action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority.”). 
 79. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Share-
holder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 
139 (1980). 
 80. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) 
(“[W]hen stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, 
attack the board’s decision as improper, the board’s decision falls under the 
‘business judgment’ rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule 
are met.”). 
 81. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a) (stating that complaints in derivative ac-
tions, after listing any efforts made to compel directors to take action, must 
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demand, the director-defendants can, and usually will, bring a 
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand pursuant to Del-
aware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.82 To avoid dismissal of the 
derivative suit, the shareholder-plaintiffs must satisfy the test 
used in Aronson v. Lewis, which requires that they allege “with 
particularity”83 facts that raise a reasonable doubt that either a 
majority of “the directors are disinterested and independent,” 
or “the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a 
valid exercise of business judgment.”84 The court draws all rea-
sonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but it accepts as true 
only well-pled factual allegations that do not include conclusory 
statements.85 The ability of the shareholders to prove one of 
these Aronson prongs is limited, as they do not have the luxury 
of full discovery.86 
If the shareholder-plaintiffs fail to prove one of the Aronson 
prongs, the court will rule that demand was not futile and the 
shareholders must make demand on the board before they can 
bring a derivative action against the directors.87 If, however, 
the shareholder-plaintiffs survive the motion to dismiss for 
failure to make demand, the director-defendants are more like-
ly to settle to avoid further litigation88 and the risk that the 
shareholder-plaintiffs will gain additional support for their 
 
give the plaintiff ’s reasons for “failure to obtain the action” or “not making the 
effort”). 
 82. See Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Fu-
tility Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 177 
(1994). See generally Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 
1996) (“Delaware courts have recognized that the standard to be used to eval-
uate a Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) motion is less stringent than the standard ap-
plied when evaluating whether a pre-suit demand has been excused in a 
stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule 23.1.”). 
 83. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1. 
 84. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
 85. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. 
 86. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208–10 (Del. 1991). At the 
demand stage, shareholder-plaintiffs are limited to section 220 discovery, 
which permits them to check the books and records of the corporation. Beam 
ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1056 (Del. 2004). 
 87. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (construing DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1). 
 88. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. Ch. 
1996). But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981) 
(describing the role of special litigation committees, which may be used to 
dismiss derivative actions before or after demand is excused). 
  
2011] THE PROBLEM WITH WASTE 1911 
 
claims once they have access to full discovery.89 As such, de-
mand futility is often the main battleground in shareholder de-
rivative litigation.90 
In their attempt to hold director-defendants personally lia-
ble through derivative suits, shareholder-plaintiffs need to pur-
sue claims that allege a violation of fiduciary duties that Dela-
ware courts will not dismiss pursuant to section 102(b)(7) 
clauses. If waste falls under the duty of loyalty, it will serve as 
a viable means to avoid dismissal due to the protection of ex-
culpation clauses. 
II.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE WASTE DOCTRINE   
The Delaware courts did not officially rule on whether 
waste falls under the duty of care (exculpable) or the duty of 
loyalty (nonexculpable). If, as recent cases indicate, waste falls 
under the duty of loyalty through the duty of good faith, the 
question becomes how difficult it is for shareholder-plaintiffs’ 
waste claims to survive the director-defendants’ 23.1 motion to 
dismiss for failure to make demand. Surprisingly, in spite of 
supposedly stringent pleading requirements, some Delaware 
courts permitted waste claims to survive past 23.1 motions 
with little factual support.91 Thus, waste serves as a viable ve-
hicle for shareholder-plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to make demand and reach discovery, as well as a 
better settlement position. This Part describes the Delaware 
courts’ procedural treatment of waste and the level of factual 
support courts required for waste claims to survive the demand 
stage of derivative litigation. 
A. THE PROCEDURAL PLACEMENT OF WASTE IN THE DELAWARE 
FIDUCIARY DUTY FRAMEWORK 
While the Delaware courts clearly stated that waste and 
good faith are connected, the Delaware Supreme Court failed to 
explicitly address the doctrinal placement of waste. This avoid-
ance leaves open the question of whether directors protected by 
 
 89. Cf. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1056 (noting the limitations on discovery during 
the demand futility stage of litigation). 
 90. See, e.g., Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1054–55 (discussing the factors that 
cause few derivative suits to reach trial). 
 91. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901–02 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing the policy of permitting waste claims to survive the 
demand stage with little support). 
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section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses are liable for waste 
claims. 
Until 2001, the Delaware Court of Chancery provided con-
flicting opinions regarding the role of waste in the Delaware fi-
duciary duty framework.92 For example, in Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin, the court of chancery strongly indicated that waste was 
a part of good faith.93 The plaintiff ’s complaint alleged that the 
director-defendants committed waste by approving a transfer of 
assets to another director for little or no compensation to the 
corporation.94 The court ruled that, if the director-defendants 
committed waste, section 102(b)(7) “would not protect them 
from personal liability because they would have acted in bad 
faith.”95 Thus, Emerald Partners indicates that waste falls un-
der the duty of good faith. 
Despite the ruling in Emerald Partners, the court of chan-
cery continued to disagree about the doctrinal placement of 
waste. In Green v. Phillips, the plaintiffs alleged that the direc-
tor-defendants committed waste by approving a salary for a 
former director in exchange for an agreement not to compete or 
divulge the company’s confidential secrets.96 The court of chan-
cery dismissed the waste claim, holding that a showing of 
waste did not implicate the duty of good faith and the directors 
were protected from a waste claim by their corporation’s section 
102(b)(7) clause.97 The court distinguished the court of chan-
cery’s decision in Emerald Partners by stating that “the waste 
claim alleged there did bring the directors’ loyalty and good 
faith into question.”98 Thus, the Green decision indicates that 
some, but not all, claims of waste will implicate bad faith. 
In White v. Panic, the Supreme Court of Delaware ad-
dressed the topic of waste, but failed to provide clarity on 
 
 92. Cf. John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of 
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a 
Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breach-
es of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 112 & n.3, 117–18 (2004) (com-
paring the treatment of Delaware courts in permitting section 102(b)(7) excul-
pation clauses to protect directors from claims of waste). 
 93. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, Civ. A. No. 9700, 1993 WL 545409, at *8 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993). 
 94. See id. at *1–2. 
 95. Id. at *8. 
 96. Green v. Phillips, Civil Action No. 14436, 1996 WL 342093, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. June 19, 1996). 
 97. See id. at *6–7. 
 98. Id. at *7. 
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waste’s procedural placement.99 In comparing waste and good 
faith, the White court stated that both standards are “similar” 
in that each requires a “reasonableness” determination—
whether no reasonable person would make the decision.100 This 
opinion indicates that, rather than waste showing bad faith, 
good faith and waste may be roughly synonymous.101 Addition-
ally, the court avoided the issue of whether a corporation’s sec-
tion 102(b)(7) clause would bar liability for waste, thereby con-
tinuing the ambiguity regarding the placement of waste within 
Delaware’s fiduciary duty framework.102 
The court of chancery nonetheless interpreted the White 
decision as indicating that waste is a part of the duty of good 
faith. In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation (Disney 
IV ), the court of chancery stated that White provided an implic-
it recognition that waste falls under the duty of good faith.103 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the waste 
issue, but curiously failed to address the court of chancery’s 
reference to the doctrinal placement of waste.104 Subsequently, 
the court of chancery continued to interpret White as implicitly 
providing that waste falls under the duty of good faith.105 In-
deed, in the court of chancery’s recent Citigroup decision, 
Chancellor Chandler cited the Disney IV opinion as justifica-
tion to avoid dismissal of the plaintiff ’s waste claim, despite the 
presence of a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause.106 Nonethe-
less, the Citigroup court used skeptical language, indicating 
that the issue regarding the procedural placement of waste is 
still not definitively settled.107 
 
 99. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001). 
 100. See id. 
 101. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court maintained that the 
methods to prove waste and good faith are similar. See 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 
2000) (“Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it 
may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith . . . .”). 
 102. See White, 783 A.2d at 555 n.43 (“Because the Court of Chancery did 
not discuss the effect of this provision in this case and because our conclusion 
obviates the need to reach this issue, we do not address it here.”). 
 103. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 749 
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006) (“The Delaware Supreme 
Court has implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad faith. It is not 
necessarily true, however, that every act of bad faith by a director constitutes 
waste.” (citing White, 783 A.2d at 553–55)). 
 104. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 73–75 (Del. 2006). 
 105. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 
n.113 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 106. See id. (citing Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 749). 
 107. See id. (“I am also not convinced that defendants would be exculpated 
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The court of chancery decisions in Disney IV and Citigroup 
indicate that waste is a part of the duty of good faith, which 
means that directors are not protected from waste claims by 
their corporations’ section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses. De-
spite the significance of the placement of waste under good 
faith, the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address 
the court of chancery’s interpretation of its decision in White. 
The continued avoidance by the Delaware Supreme Court of 
the doctrinal position of waste is unfortunate, given the impli-
cations of the Disney IV and Citigroup decisions for the protec-
tions of directors under section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses. 
B. THE ABILITY OF PLAINTIFFS ALLEGING WASTE TO SUCCEED 
IN DEMONSTRATING DEMAND FUTILITY 
If waste falls under the duty of good faith and is, therefore, 
not an exculpable claim, the question becomes how difficult it is 
for plaintiffs alleging waste to survive motions to dismiss for 
failure to make demand. Despite the steep factual require-
ments of the Aronson test and the difficulty in succeeding with 
a waste claim at trial, the Delaware courts are often lenient in 
the facts required for a waste claim to survive the demand 
stage of derivative litigation.108 
A plaintiff who seeks to avoid making demand on the board 
must demonstrate demand futility under the Aronson test.109 
The first prong of the Aronson test mandates that the plaintiff 
must create a “reasonable doubt” that a majority of the board is 
not “disinterested and independent.”110 A plaintiff who brings a 
waste claim will attempt to satisfy the second prong and create 
a “reasonable doubt” that “the challenged transaction was oth-
erwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”111 
Both prongs require that the plaintiff make particularized fac-
tual allegations to demonstrate demand futility.112 
The Delaware courts are strict in the level of factual alle-
gations required to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 
 
under Citigroup’s certificate for committing waste.” (emphasis added)). 
 108. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 109. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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make demand under the first prong of the Aronson test.113 Del-
aware courts found that many potential indications that direc-
tors have a stake in a transaction are insufficient to demon-
strate that they are not “disinterested and independent.”114 
Despite the high level of factual support required for a 
plaintiff to survive under the first prong of the Aronson test, 
the Delaware courts demonstrated inconsistency in the facts 
necessary for a claim of waste to bypass demand under the 
second Aronson prong.115 Many Delaware courts are hesitant to 
dismiss claims of waste, as they are fact-specific allegations.116 
This approach permits plaintiffs who claim waste to survive to 
discovery, even if the claim is “barely supported by the 
record.”117 
Examples illustrate the ease with which some waste claims 
survive demand. In Emerald Partners, the shareholder-
plaintiffs supported their allegation of waste by noting that au-
ditor reports showing a transfer of corporate assets did not note 
any return compensation for the corporation.118 Despite the 
contention of the defendants that this omission did not mean 
there was no return compensation, the court of chancery drew 
 
 113. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stew-
art, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del. 2004). 
 114. Under the first prong of the Aronson test, “it is not enough to charge 
that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of those controlling 
the outcome of a corporate election.” 473 A.2d at 816. Additionally, it is insuf-
ficient to only allege domination or control. Id. Instead, the plaintiff must “al-
lege particularized facts manifesting ‘a direction of corporate conduct in such a 
way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) 
doing the controlling’.” Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 
(Del. Ch. 1971)). 
 115. Cf. Reed & Neiderman, supra note 92, at 117 (“Delaware cases involv-
ing the effect of a § 102(b)(7) charter provision on allegations of waste have 
held that some, but not all, claims for monetary damages based on a theory of 
waste may be subject to dismissal in light of an exculpatory provision.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (“Claims 
of gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to disposition by sum-
mary judgment . . . .”); Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240, 243 (Del. Ch. 1954) 
(stating that the determination of a gift of corporate assets is “largely a ques-
tion of fact”). But see Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (criticizing the policy of permitting waste claims past the 
summary judgment stage of litigation); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 
338–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that some claims of waste may be dismissed 
before discovery). 
 117. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982); see also Harbor 
Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 902 (“[Waste] claims with no genuine likelihood of 
success can make it to discovery and perhaps to trial.”). 
 118. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, Civ. A. No. 97000, 1993 WL 545409, at *6 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993).  
  
1916 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1899 
 
the inference in favor of the plaintiffs and denied the director-
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make demand.119 
Thus, the court did not require the shareholder-plaintiffs to al-
lege particularized facts demonstrating a lack of compensation, 
but, instead, was willing to construe the omission in the auditor 
reports in favor of the plaintiffs.120 
In Weiss v. Swanson, the plaintiff alleged that the director-
defendants committed waste by granting themselves stock op-
tions without a valid corporate purpose, but the plaintiff failed 
to provide evidence indicating the lack of purpose.121 Even 
though the court recognized the steep hurdle plaintiffs must 
meet to succeed on waste claims at trial, Vice Chancellor Lamb 
was remarkably lenient with the level of deference granted to 
the plaintiff ’s waste claim.122 Indeed, the vice chancellor per-
mitted the waste claim to survive the motion to dismiss for 
failure to make demand because he could not “conclude that 
there is no reasonably conceivable set of facts under which 
[plaintiff] could prove a claim of waste.”123 Thus, the court did 
not require particularized facts demonstrating that there was 
no corporate purpose behind the stock options. 
Additionally, the recent decision of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in Citigroup illustrates the leniency afforded to 
plaintiffs who assert demand futility under the second prong of 
the Aronson test. In Citigroup, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
board committed waste in the level of compensation granted to 
the departing CEO, Prince.124 The court of chancery denied the 
director-defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make de-
mand despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide particularized 
factual allegations with regard to the amount that Prince was 
given, or the value of compensation afforded to the corpora-
tion.125 The court’s decision to allow the waste claim to proceed 
to discovery without these facts illustrates the ease with which 
some claims of waste may survive rule 23.1 motions to dismiss. 
 
 119. Id. at *6–7. 
 120. See id. at *6. 
 121. Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 125. Id. (“I am left with very little information regarding (1) how much ad-
ditional compensation Prince actually received as a result of the letter agree-
ment and (2) the real value, if any, of the various promises given by Prince.”).  
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These examples show that Delaware courts do not always 
require particularized factual allegations to permit a claim of 
waste to survive demand under the second Aronson prong. This 
low factual requirement is poorly chosen, considering that 
waste is theoretically the most deferential standard for direc-
tor-defendants.126 
Not all waste claims survive the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for failure to make demand.127 Claims of waste failed 
due to procedural mistakes,128 or a poorly crafted complaint.129 
Additionally, some Delaware decisions employed a heightened 
requirement of particularized factual allegations that was simi-
lar to those required under the first prong of the Aronson 
test.130 Finally, Delaware courts also dismissed claims of waste 
on the vague grounds that the complaint made conclusory alle-
gations.131 Nonetheless, the dismissal of waste claims by some 
courts merely indicates that the Delaware courts differ in the 
level of factual allegations required for a waste claim to survive 
a rule 23.1 motion.132 
The ease with which some Delaware courts permit claims 
of waste to proceed past the demand stage of derivative litiga-
tion is shown in the success rates of waste claims. A 2001 study 
of 124 derivative claims challenging executive compensation 
packages in both public and closely held corporations shows 
that, including all stages of litigation,133 waste claims succeed 
in Delaware at a similar rate to duty of loyalty and care 
 
 126. See Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1 
(Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“[Waste is] an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a 
shareholder plaintiff . ”). 
 127. See, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137 (dismissing a claim of waste 
that included allegations that the board repurchased stock at market value, 
which the court construed, in and of itself, to indicate a rational decision). 
 128. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (dismissing the waste claim because the plaintiffs previously made 
demand on the board). 
 129. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000). 
 130. See, e.g., White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 555 (Del. 2001). 
 131. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds, Brehm, 746 A.2d 244. 
 132. Cf. Reed & Neiderman, supra note 92, at 117. 
 133. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to 
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 583 (2001) 
(“[W]e define success as defeating a motion to dismiss for failure to make de-
mand, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary 
judgment, or prevailing at trial or on appeal.”). 
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claims.134 This success rate is astonishingly high, considering 
that it includes the postdemand stage portions of litigation 
where it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to succeed with 
waste claims.135 
This analysis indicates two findings. First, the waste 
standard in Delaware corporate law is arguably a part of the 
duty of good faith, which is not exculpable under a corporation’s 
section 102(b)(7) clause. Second, some Delaware courts do not 
require particularized factual allegations for a waste claim to 
survive a rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to make de-
mand. Together, these two factors permit plaintiffs who bring 
waste claims to both avoid exculpation clauses and survive the 
demand stage of derivative litigation without alleging particu-
larized factual allegations, thereby creating a means to effec-
tively avoid the demand requirement. 
III.  RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS TO DELAWARE’S 
APPROACH TO WASTE   
This Note recommends that the Delaware courts explicitly 
place waste under the duty of good faith. The Delaware courts 
should also uniformly apply the particularized factual allega-
tion requirement to ensure that only the most worthwhile 
waste claims survive a rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to 
make demand. 
A. WASTE BELONGS UNDER THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
Delaware courts should remove the current fog of ambigui-
ty around the waste standard and explicitly state that waste is 
a part of the duty of good faith.136 While there are substantial 
public policy arguments against permitting courts to review the 
 
 134. The Thomas and Martin study of cases between 1912 and 2000, id. at 
573, found that waste claims succeeded in twenty-nine percent of the Dela-
ware cases, id. at 583, compared to twenty-seven percent for duty of care 
claims, id. at 582, and thirty percent for duty of loyalty claims, id. at 585. Ad-
ditionally, the study found that plaintiffs raised waste claims in more cases 
(ninety-seven out of 124) than duty of care (twenty out of 124) or loyalty (eighty-
two out of 124) claims. Id. at 583. 
 135. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (describing the difficulty plaintiffs face when bringing a waste claim 
at trial). 
 136. Some commentators argue that waste should fall under the duty of 
care, rather than the duty of loyalty. E.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 84–
90 (5th ed. 1998). See generally Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262–63 (finding that plain-
tiff ’s “substantive due care” claim was actually a waste claim). 
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substantive decisions of directors, these concerns are mis-
guided, as waste only applies to indefensible director decisions. 
An explicit ruling that places waste under good faith would 
provide a new mechanism for shareholders to hold directors ac-
countable for their irrational business decisions. The economic 
crisis that began in 2007 and the ensuing dramatic detrimental 
impact upon shareholders137 demonstrate the need to make ad-
justments to the ways that directors manage corporations.138 
By placing waste under the duty of good faith, waste would be-
come a viable vehicle for shareholders to bring derivative suits 
against directors, even if they are protected by section 102(b)(7) 
exculpation clauses.139 This could have several important rami-
fications.  
First, shareholders would be able to hold directors who 
make irrational business decisions personally accountable for 
the harm they cause to the corporation through those deci-
sions.140 Waste is a stringent standard, so it would only be a vi-
able claim for completely unreasonable decisions.141 Nonethe-
less, recent decisions of boards and their impact upon the 
shareholders of corporations,142 as well as both the national 
and world economies,143 indicate that a claim that addresses ir-
 
 137. Cf. Dash & Creswell, supra note 1, at (describing the decline in Citi-
group’s share price during the economic crisis). 
 138. There is an ongoing debate regarding whether the directors of Dela-
ware corporations that sustained substantial losses in the financial crisis also 
suffered significant personal financial harm, perhaps indicating that addition-
al regulatory mechanisms are inappropriate. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk et 
al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Leh-
man 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 (2010) (finding that executives 
at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers avoided substantial personal financial 
losses during the crisis), with Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank 
CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1–2 (Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in 
Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2010), available at http://www 
.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (finding that CEOs at corporations that expe-
rienced significant losses during the crisis also suffered substantial personal 
financial harm). 
 139. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the 
provision does not apply to “acts or omissions not in good faith”). 
 140. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the 
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 
1183 (1999) (arguing that the deference to decisions of directors under the 
business judgment rule creates a “lack of accountability”). 
 141. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
 142. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 1. 
 143. Cf. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 112–
13 (Del. Ch. 2009) (describing some aspects of the economic downturn). 
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rational decisions may be a necessary and viable mechanism of 
accountability. 
Second, the placement of waste under the duty of good 
faith would provide a means to empower the shareholders of 
Delaware corporations. If corporations’ exculpation clauses pro-
tect directors from claims of waste, shareholders will lose a 
means to constrain the irrational decisions of board mem-
bers.144 By placing waste under good faith, the Delaware courts 
will permit shareholders to protect both their individual inter-
ests and the interests of the corporation against directors who 
choose to make irrational decisions with significant detrimental 
impacts.145 
Third, an explicit statement by the Delaware courts that 
waste falls under the duty of good faith may change the culture 
of Delaware’s corporations.146 Directors who commit waste 
would not be able to hide behind exculpation clauses.147 The 
threat of personal liability may force directors to avoid irra-
tional and indefensible decisions, while still permitting boards 
discretion for the vast majority of their decisions.148 Such an 
adjustment to board culture and decisions is warranted, as evi-
denced by the recent economic crisis.149 
 
 144. Cf. D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, 
and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 886 (2007) (arguing that, 
outside the situation where discovery would harm the corporation, the busi-
ness judgment rule and the deference granted to the decisions of boards by the 
Delaware courts “impedes the adjudication of shareholder rights and inter-
ests” and “prevents shareholder actions from constraining boards”). 
 145. Cf. Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 95, 135 (2004) (arguing for a stronger waste standard to curb excessive 
compensation packages). 
 146. See Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 518–22 (2009) (discussing the role of Delaware judi-
cial decisions on directors internalizing new notions of the duty of loyalty). 
 147. See, e.g., In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 178–79 
(Del. Ch. 2005). 
 148. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 444 (“Proponents of enhanced judicial scru-
tiny in good faith cases point to the incentive effects of a more stringent stand-
ard of review.”). Commentators also suggest that directors merely complying 
with recent notions of loyalty may increase trust “among corporate directors, 
their shareholders, and other interested parties.” Gold, supra note 146, at 509. 
 149. Cf. Dash & Creswell, supra note 1 (discussing decisions and a lack of 
oversight that led Citigroup into financial difficulties). But see Desimone v. 
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 931–32 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[The] justified concern that 
concepts of fiduciary duty not be used in an unprincipled and wholly-elastic 
way to reach any and all behavior that, upon first blush, strikes judges as in-
appropriate.”). 
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Fourth, the placement of waste under the duty of good 
faith will serve to simplify Delaware’s system of fiduciary du-
ties. The Delaware Supreme Court demonstrated an interest in 
simplifying the fiduciary duty framework in Stone v. Ritter by 
making good faith a part of the duty of loyalty.150 Removing 
waste from its current procedural limbo and placing it under 
good faith will further this simplification by creating only two 
overarching fiduciary duties in Delaware corporate law: the du-
ties of loyalty and care.151 
Finally, placing waste under good faith will provide conti-
nuity to Delaware’s treatment of the waste doctrine.152 While 
the Disney IV and Citigroup decisions provide some measure of 
ambiguity regarding the placement of waste, they also serve as 
precedent that waste may fall under good faith.153 Thus, waste 
as a part of good faith would permit both courts and litigants to 
predict the Delaware courts’ treatment of waste claims.154 
A claim of waste permits Delaware courts to review the 
substantive decisions of boards of directors, so placing it under 
the duty of loyalty and making it a nonexculpable claim raises 
serious public policy issues. First, Delaware statutory law 
grants the authority to manage a corporation to its board of di-
rectors.155 Permitting courts to review the substantive decisions 
of boards by making waste a nonexculpable claim arguably in-
 
 150. See Velasco, supra note 37, at 1234. 
 151. See id. (“[M]any scholars and jurists have been seeking to return the 
law of fiduciary duties to greater simplicity. One manifestation of this move-
ment is rebifurcation.”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Conver-
gence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 585–88 (2008) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of expanding the duty of loyalty to situations that do not 
involve improper personal benefit). 
 152. Some authors caution, however, that the Delaware courts’ frequent 
announcements of new fiduciary law detract from the continuity of Delaware 
corporate law. See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery 
of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16–17. 
 153. See, e.g., Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The Delaware 
Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad 
faith.”). Some commentators note, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court 
occasionally does not seem concerned with notions of stare decisis. See, e.g., 
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000). 
 154. Cf. Romano, supra note 75, at 85 (noting the importance of clarifying 
legal rules). 
 155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is 
the offspring of the fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of 
a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”), over-
ruled on other grounds, Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
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terferes with this statutory mandate.156 Additionally, making 
waste a viable claim against directors might cause director 
candidates to refuse positions on boards to avoid the potential 
for liability, thereby preventing corporations from gaining the 
most talented candidates as directors.157  
These concerns are not well-founded, as waste is a stand-
ard reserved for irrational director decisions.158 As such, waste 
is a self-limiting doctrine that will only permit the courts to 
find directors liable for the most egregious of business deci-
sions.159 The placement of waste under the duty of good faith 
will permit boards to freely manage their corporations, so long 
as they avoid irrational and extreme decisions.160 Similarly, 
qualified candidates will not be detracted from serving on the 
boards of Delaware corporations, as the potential for personal 
liability is minimized by the stringent nature of the waste 
standard.161 
Second, some might argue that judges lack the business 
expertise to review the substantive decisions of boards,162 
which would be permitted by making waste a viable claim 
 
 156. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (“Limiting the availability of derivative 
suits protects the board’s ability to manage the corporation.”). Some commen-
tators and courts suggest that the waste standard should be eliminated entire-
ly. E.g., William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Stand-
ards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1317–18 
(2001); see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the 
fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending 
through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides no ground for director 
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”). 
 157. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (noting that the risk of deterring com-
petent directors from serving on boards is one justification for the protections 
of the business judgment rule). 
 158. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 263 (Del. 2000)) (describing the plaintiff’s burden in demonstrating waste). 
 159. See Lewis v. Austen, No. C.A. 12937, 1999 WL 378125, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. 1999). 
 160. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263). 
 161. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (describing waste as “theoretical”). 
 162. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical 
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 758 (2000). The initial articulation of 
this argument is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where the court declined to 
impose its business judgment over that of the board. 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919). 
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through its incorporation into the duty of good faith.163 Courts 
also have the luxury of viewing all the ramifications of a busi-
ness decision, while directors are limited to the information 
available at the time of the decision.164 This may cause courts 
to have hindsight bias and view the substantive decisions of 
boards in a negatively skewed light due to the results of those 
decisions, regardless of whether those results were foreseea-
ble.165 Judges also are not accountable for their decisions, so 
there are no repercussions if they render an inappropriate deci-
sion.166 Finally, these critics may support their argument that 
judges are ill suited to review the substantive decisions of di-
rectors by noting the Delaware courts’ inconsistent treatment 
of waste claims at the demand stage of derivative litigation.167 
These arguments fail to acknowledge that Delaware judges 
typically hold a high level of business expertise and expe-
rience.168 Delaware judges also have substantial incentives to 
maintain their personal reputations and will be cautious in the 
exercise of their review of the substantive decisions of direc-
tors.169 These traits ensure that judges will take caution to ap-
propriately decide cases, giving the proper level of deference to 
 
 163. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the 
protections of a board’s section 102(b)(7) clause do not extend to decisions 
made in bad faith). 
 164. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The entrepre-
neur’s function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a rea-
soned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later 
against a background of perfect knowledge.”). Courts also may not have as 
much information about the corporation as the directors. Bainbridge, supra 
note 27, at 119. 
 165. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523 (1998); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 100 
(1991) (“Judges also are accustomed to deciding cases on full records and may 
be too quick to blame managers who act—as often they should—in haste or on 
incomplete information.”); Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 114 (“Given the vagar-
ies of business . . . even carefully made choices . . . may turn out badly.”). 
 166. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 165, at 100 (“Judges are nei-
ther chosen for business acumen nor fired or subject to reductions in salary if 
they err in assessing business situations.”). 
 167. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (noting that there is no logical terminus once courts begin to review the 
substantive decisions of directors). 
 168. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 120 (“In contrast to judges in other 
states[,] . . . Delaware chancellors frequently have considerable prior corporate 
experience as practitioners.”); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990). 
 169. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 121. 
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directors for their information shortfalls at the time of deci-
sions.170 Any inconsistency in the handling of waste claims by 
the Delaware courts is, therefore, not attributable to the quali-
fications or incentives of the judges, but the contradictory doc-
trines of making waste the theoretically most difficult standard 
to prove, and yet easily permitting waste claims to survive the 
demand stage of derivative litigation.171 
Third, some may argue that Delaware courts should not 
review the substantive decisions of boards through the waste 
standard, as there are already market mechanisms that protect 
shareholders and constrain directors.172 Today, institutional 
investors function as active shareholders, removing collective 
action issues present with a large number of small sharehold-
ers173 and providing a mechanism of control over directors.174 
Additionally, directors have incentives to make appropriate de-
cisions to maintain and improve their personal reputations.175 
Finally, dissatisfied shareholders can simply vote out any of-
fending board members.176 Thus, judicial review of the substan-
 
 170. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recognize 
that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate 
business decisions.”). 
 171. Compare Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (stating that waste claims frequently survive the demand stage of 
derivative litigation with little factual support), with Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 
1051–52 (describing waste as “theoretical”). 
 172. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private 
Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 303–06 (1988); cf. Mark J. Roe, German Codeter-
mination and German Securities Markets, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167, 181 
(noting that directors of American corporations are monitored by market 
mechanisms). 
 173. William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independ-
ents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1089–90 (1999). 
 174. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: 
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 926 (1992) (“Institutions are 
more likely than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to vote against 
manager proposals, and more likely to vote for proposals by other sharehold-
ers.”). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional In-
vestor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1292–93 (1991) (noting 
that many institutional investors do not challenge the positions of directors). 
 175. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 122; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1832–35 (2001) (discussing the effects 
of shaming sanctions on corporate managers). 
 176. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of 
Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and 
Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 451– 
52 (2002). 
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tive decisions of boards is arguably an unnecessary and “re-
dundant” check on a board of directors.177 
Despite these concerns, market mechanisms do not always 
apply an adequate check to the discretion of directors.178 Even 
during good economic times, directors may make irrationally 
risky decisions.179 The potential for directors to make poor deci-
sions is only exacerbated when corporations face a financial cri-
sis.180 Under such circumstances, directors have incentives to 
make risky decisions, perhaps even irrationally risky choices, 
as directors have far less to lose if their decisions create finan-
cially devastating results for their corporation and its share-
holders.181 The recent financial crisis is an example of how 
market mechanisms failed to adequately check the unbridled 
discretion of directors when their corporations faced difficult 
situations.182 Thus, judicial review of the substantive decisions 
of boards through the stringent waste standard is not redun-
dant, but rather provides a necessary check upon the decisions 
of directors.183 
Similar to the market mechanism concern, critics of plac-
ing waste under the duty of good faith would argue that per-
mitting courts to review the substantive decisions of boards 
through the waste standard would stifle directors’ ability to 
make beneficial risky decisions.184 According to these critics, 
 
 177. See Ronald J. Gibson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981). 
 178. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and 
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1808 
(2001) (finding that external market sanctions do not always serve as a viable 
means to regulate director actions). 
 179. Cf. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism 
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1001 (2003) (discussing 
the lack of an adequate qualitative judicial response to the rise of executive 
compensation packages). 
 180. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate 
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2003). 
 181. See id. 
 182. Cf. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (noting the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 183. Cf. Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and 
Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1906 (1992) (arguing that shareholders 
who wish to curb director compensation packages should “consider enlisting the 
aid of the courts”). But see Blair & Stout, supra note 178, at 1808 (finding that 
judicial sanctions are not always a successful method to curb director conduct). 
 184. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (describing risks associated with judicial “second-guessing” of directors’ 
substantive business decisions). 
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risky decisions are desirable, as they hold the potential to yield 
greater returns to the corporation and promote innovation.185 
Additionally, shareholders of corporations have little incentive 
to stifle risky decisions by directors, as they stand to benefit 
greatly by such decisions,186 while under little risk of substan-
tial losses or liability.187 Thus, the concern is that judicial over-
sight of the substantive decisions of directors will cause boards 
to avoid beneficial risky decisions out of fear of personal liabili-
ty.188 
The beneficial risk concern is misguided in the context of 
waste claims. Directors will not avoid beneficial risk due to the 
threat imposed by waste, as the potential for personal liability 
is mitigated by the difficulty for plaintiffs to establish a claim of 
waste.189 The vast majority of directorial decisions are not irra-
tional, as seen by the infrequency of successful waste claims.190 
As such, there is little basis to argue that judicial review of di-
rector decisions through the waste standard will hinder direc-
tors’ propensity towards the assumption of beneficial risk.191 
Delaware courts should place waste under the duty of good 
faith, as this will provide a nonexculpable means for sharehold-
ers to hold directors personally liable for making irrational de-
cisions, and potentially shift corporate culture away from inde-
fensible decisionmaking. The concerns typically associated with 
 
 185. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. d (1994). 
 186. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 258–60 (8th ed. 2002). 
 187. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 111. See generally RONALD J. 
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT 95–97 (1993) (stating that shareholders can limit their personal 
risk by diversifying their portfolio).  
 188. See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (“[D]irectors will tend to deviate from 
this rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation to 
undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some degree of per-
sonal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative liability for any result-
ing corporate loss.”); Allen et al., supra note 176, at 450 (“By intruding on the 
protected space that the business judgment rule accords such decisions, courts 
create disincentives for businesses to engage in the risk-taking that is funda-
mental to a capitalist economy.”). 
 189. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating 
that the current waste standard permits directors to assume “optimal rational 
acceptance of risk”). 
 190. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at 
*5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (describing a successful claim of waste as the “rar-
est of all” claims). 
 191. See id. at *1 (stating that one reason for making the waste test diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to satisfy is to preserve the risk-taking incentive for directors). 
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judicial review of substantive decisions of boards are inappro-
priate when dealing with waste, as this is a stringent standard 
that will only police the most egregious director decisions. The 
benefits of placing waste under good faith are severely limited, 
however, if courts permit waste claims to easily survive rule 
23.1 motions to dismiss for failure to make demand.  
B. DELAWARE COURTS SHOULD UNIFORMLY EMPLOY A 
HEIGHTENED FACTUAL REQUIREMENT FOR WASTE CLAIMS AT 
THE DEMAND STAGE OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
While there are numerous benefits to permitting judicial 
oversight of the substantive decisions of boards through the 
waste standard, these are less persuasive if Delaware courts 
allow waste claims to easily survive the demand stage of litiga-
tion. To preserve the managerial authority of boards and pre-
vent needless litigation costs, the Delaware courts should uni-
formly apply the particularized factual allegation requirement 
to waste claims when determining demand futility. 
The current lack of uniformity in requiring plaintiffs to 
plead particularized factual allegations for waste permits some 
claims of waste to easily survive past the demand stage of liti-
gation and reach expensive discovery.192 Requiring a low level 
of factual specificity for waste claims under rule 23.1 motions 
has the potential for numerous negative consequences. First, 
Delaware corporations and shareholders will suffer. Discovery 
has the potential to “disrupt normal corporate functions” and 
potentially “force corporations to reveal their prospective busi-
ness plans.”193 Additionally, derivative suits that reach discov-
ery impose potential financial and reputation costs upon direc-
tors and their corporations.194 These costs are a significant 
reason as to why directors are much more likely to settle deriv-
ative suits if they succeed in pleading demand futility.195 One of 
the primary functions of the demand requirement is to elimi-
nate dubious derivative suits, thereby permitting only worth-
while claims to impose these burdens upon directors and corpo-
rations.196  
 
 192. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 (Del. 
Ch. 1999). 
 193. Gold, supra note 48, at 467. 
 194. See Telman, supra note 144, at 839. 
 195. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements 
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 531–32 (1991). 
 196. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. Ch. 
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The current treatment of waste by the Delaware courts 
does not protect directors and corporations from these strike 
suits. Permitting waste claims to survive demand with minimal 
factual allegations essentially removes the important demand 
obstacle and imposes warrantless financial and reputation 
costs upon directors and corporations.197 While viable claims of 
waste are rare and do not provide an obstacle to corporations 
finding the most qualified directors, these candidates may 
avoid serving on boards if they frequently have to settle claims 
of waste to avoid discovery.198 To preserve the demand re-
quirement and protect directors and corporations from strike 
suits, the Delaware courts should uniformly apply a particular-
ized factual allegation requirement to waste claims brought by 
plaintiffs who seek to avoid making demand on the board under 
the second Aronson prong. 
Second, permitting waste to easily survive demand allows 
Delaware courts to limit the statutorily granted managerial au-
thority conferred to directors under Delaware corporate law.199 
If a plaintiff need only plead waste to survive demand, Dela-
ware courts will be able to review all substantive decisions of 
boards. While this substantive review is defensible if plaintiffs 
provide particularized factual allegations in their claims of 
waste, it becomes an impermissible restriction on the directors’ 
right to manage their corporation when plaintiffs may survive 
to discovery with dubious claims.200 Thus, to limit the substan-
tive review of director decisions to extreme cases, the Delaware 
courts should uniformly apply a heightened factual pleading 
requirement to waste claims. 
Finally, the current Delaware treatment of waste claims at 
the demand stage threatens to limit directors’ assumption of 
 
1996); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Pro-
tecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 
952 (1993) (arguing in favor of the demand stage due to its particularized fac-
tual allegation requirement). 
 197. Permitting claims of waste to easily reach discovery also poses unnec-
essary costs upon the Delaware judiciary. Cf. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule 
that Isn’t a Rule – the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637–38 
(2002) (describing one justification for the business judgment rule as the “con-
servation of the judicial resource”). 
 198. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (noting that one justification for the 
business judgment rule is the fear that directors will not serve on boards if 
there is a high risk of personal liability). 
 199. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
 200. Cf. Gold, supra note 48, at 445 (“Limiting the availability of derivative 
suits protects the board’s ability to manage the corporation.”). 
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risk. As viable waste claims are rare, directors only have to fear 
liability for waste from irrational decisions.201 This balance is 
lost if waste claims can easily survive the demand stage. To 
avoid settling large numbers of waste claims, directors may 
start to avoid the assumption of risk, which would serve to 
harm both corporations and shareholders.202 To protect director 
assumption of beneficial risk, Delaware courts should require 
particularized factual allegations for waste claims, thereby only 
permitting well-pled claims of waste to survive to discovery. 
The benefits accrued from Delaware courts reviewing the 
substantive decisions of boards through waste claims are lim-
ited if courts permit claims of waste to survive rule 23.1 mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to make demand with only minimal 
factual pleadings. Courts should uniformly require particular-
ized factual allegations for all claims of waste at the demand 
stage of derivative litigation. 
  CONCLUSION   
Waste is a stringent standard that is meant to hold direc-
tors personally liable for irrational business decisions. Despite 
some indication from Delaware courts that waste is a part of 
the duty of good faith and is, therefore, nonexculpable by a cor-
poration’s section 102(b)(7) clause, the courts failed to explicitly 
state the procedural placement of waste within Delaware’s fi-
duciary duty framework. In addition to this ambiguity, some 
Delaware courts permit waste to survive the important demand 
stage of derivative litigation with minimal factual allegations. 
Delaware courts should explicitly hold that waste falls un-
der the duty of good faith, and thus permit shareholders to hold 
directors accountable for irrational business decisions and po-
tentially create a corporate culture different from the one that 
produced the recent economic crisis. However, the benefits of 
permitting courts to review the substantive decisions of direc-
tors through the waste standard are lost if some courts permit 
claims of waste to easily survive rule 23.1 motions to dismiss 
for failure to make demand. Thus, Delaware courts should un-
iformly require that plaintiffs plead particularized factual alle-
gations for claims of waste to succeed in demonstrating demand 
futility. 
 
 201. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). 
 202. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
